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Introduction
Although banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lack depth compared to other parts of the developing world, an influential study by the World Bank has shown that savings mobilization in this region does not represent a binding constraint on financial deepening (Honohan and Beck, 2007) . Drawing on surveys and other qualitative information, the World Bank study concludes that SSA banks do not lend enough -and as a result are excessively liquid compared to banks in other regions -because of a lack of acceptable or 'bankable' loan applications. Moreover, the study suggests that bank lending is often unprofitable because of severe information problems including lack of credit bureaus and weak contract enforcement. These intriguing insights lend themselves to rigorous macro-econometric analysis, not least because of their important policy implications. 1 To this end, this paper provides new macro-econometric evidence from a panel of 18 SSA countries over the period 1975 to 2006 that is consistent with the findings of the World Bank study. Specifically, we provide evidence to suggest that the relationship between finance and growth in the region is a rather loose one: finance, at best, follows growth; at worst there is no evidence of a significant long run link between the two. We show that the worst-case scenario is obtained when financial development is measured by bank credit while the best-case scenario occurs when it is measured by liquid liabilities, an indicator that measures the size of bank balance sheets. 2 We utilize the latest panel econometric techniques for non-stationary data that make the most of limited data availability for SSA countries. Such data scarcity is indeed the main factor explaining why empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus in Africa are still in their infancy. Although a handful of such studies is now available -a good example of which is Gries et al. (2009) -these studies rely on individual country estimates obtained with relatively small samples and, as such, inference may be unreliable and/or inefficient compared to panel data methods. In contrast, the techniques we utilize circumvent these problems by combining 32 time observations with 18 cross-sections, resulting in a sample of 576 observations. This generates marked improvements in the reliability of statistical inference while respecting the non-stationary properties of the data and allowing cross-country heterogeneity. We avoid the limitations of conventional panel cointegration methods by allowing for cross-country dependence, utilizing some of the very latest advances in the panel cointegration literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and econometric methodology. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 1 These ideas are developed further in a recent paper by Andrianova et al. (2010) , which shows that, when contract enforcement is weak, a credit market equilibrium with a high degree of loan defaults and low bank lending -the 'African credit trap' -can arise. Andrianova et al. (2010) also provide micro-econometric evidence utilizing panel data on hundreds of African banks over a tenyear period that is consistent with these predictions.
Data and Methodology
The basic empirical model we postulate between financial and economic development, denoted FD it and Y it respectively, is the following simple log-linear relationship Table (Table 6. 3), compiled by Heston et al. (2006) , updated in November 2009.
To test whether the variables are stationary or not, we consider five panel unit root tests. The first group consists of the tests of Im et al. (2003) , Levin et al. (2002) and Harris and Tzavalis (1999) , denoted W tbar , t* and ρ, respectively, which assume cross-sectional independence. The second group of tests allows for crosssectional dependence and comprises the tests of Breitung (2000) and Pesaran (2007) , denoted λ and Z tbar , respectively. 4 All tests are normally distributed under the common null hypothesis of non-stationarity.
Provided that the variables are I(1) and that the regression error is stationary, equation (1) may be viewed as representing a cointegrating relationship. The second step in our analysis is, therefore, to test whether financial and economic development are cointegrated. We use the four panel cointegration tests of Westerlund (2007) , which have good small-sample properties and high power relative to popular residual-based panel cointegration tests (e.g. Pedroni, 2004) . Furthermore, asymptotic and bootstrap p-values are computed, the latter making inference possible under very general forms of cross-sectional dependence. The tests are designed to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration by testing whether the error correction term in a conditional error correction model is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no error correction is rejected, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is also rejected. The error correction model we consider is as follows:
The countries are: Burundi, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Seychelles and Togo. These countries were chosen taking into account data availability and the fact that the techniques employed in this paper require a balanced panel. We have tried to include as many countries as possible over as long a sample period as possible.
To formally test whether the cross-sectional units are independent, we assume that e it is formed by a combination of a fixed component specific to the country and a random component that captures pure noise and estimate (2) using the FE estimator. We then use the Pesaran (2004) CD test on the residuals of (2) under the FE specification. The CD test statistic is normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence.
Finally, where evidence of cointegration is obtained, the third step in our analysis consists in estimating the long-run coefficient of real income per capita (LY). For this purpose, we use the newly developed estimators of Bai et al. (2009) known as CupBC (continuously-updated and bias-corrected) and CupFM (continuously updated and fully-modified) estimators. These two estimators have been shown to be superior in terms of mean bias to the LSDV (least squares dummy variables) and 2sFM (2-stage fully modified) estimators.
Empirical Results
The results of the panel unit root tests reported in Table 1 suggest that the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level for any variables. 5 The only exception is LL, for which the null can be rejected at the 10% level when using the W tbar test. Since this rejection is very marginal, we treat all four variables as non-stationary and proceed to test for cointegration.
The computed values of the panel cointegration statistics are presented in Table 2 along with the asymptotic and bootstrapped p-values based on 500 replications.
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The results from equation (2) with bank deposits as the dependent variable indicate that the no cointegration null is never rejected when using the asymptotic p-values, except for G τ at the 10% level (i.e. when ρ i is not restricted to be homogenous). Based on the bootstrapped p-values (i.e. when allowance is made for cross-sectional dependence), the no cointegration null is only rejected for G τ at the 5% level. Hence, there is little evidence of cointegration in this case. Similarly, the results with private credit as the dependent variable show that the no cointegration null is never rejected, providing even less support for cointegration.
In contrast, the results with liquid liabilities as the dependent variable provide evidence of cointegration. With the asymptotic p-values, the no cointegration null is not only rejected for G τ at the 1% level but also for P τ at the 10% level (i.e. when ρ i is restricted to be homogenous), suggesting that the whole panel is cointegrated. The results with the bootstrapped p-values provide even stronger evidence of cointegration. The no cointegration null is always rejected at least at the 10% level regardless of whether ρ i is restricted to be homogenous or not. Since the homogenous alternative is particularly restrictive, these results provide strong evidence that the whole panel is cointegrated. 5 The Pesaran (2007) test is performed using the Stata "pescadf" command written by Piotr Lewandoski. 6 The tests are performed using the Stata "xtwest" command (see Persyn and Westerlund, 2008) .
In small datasets, as in this study with T=32, Westerlund (2007) warns that the results of the tests may be sensitive to the specific choice of lag and lead lengths. Hence, to avoid overparametrization and the resulting loss of power, we hold the short-run dynamics fixed (i.e. p i =p=1) in equation (2).
The Westerlund (2007) tests rely on the assumption of weakly exogenous regressors. In order to shed some light on the appropriateness of this assumption, we perform a series of reverse regression tests, the results of which are reported in Table 3 . If LY is indeed weakly exogenous, then it should not be errorcorrecting. The results with LY as the dependent variable show that, consistent with the notion of weak exogeneity, the null of no error-correction cannot be rejected with either of the finance indicators as the regressor. Hence, there seems to be no violation of the weak exogeneity assumption.
The results of the cross-sectional independence tests are reported in Table 4 .
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The CD test always strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence.
Since we find evidence of cointegration between liquid liabilities and real GDP per capita, we proceed to estimate the long-run coefficient of LY with LL as the dependent variable. We use the Bai et al. (2009) estimators in order to account for the cross-sectional dependence in the data. The CupBC and CupFM estimation results are reported in Table 5 . 8 Both estimators produce very similar results. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant in both cases. This suggests the existence of a stable and positive long-run relationship between the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and economic development. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient suggests that a 1% increase in real per capita income translates on average into a 2% increase in banking system development.
Summary and Policy Implications
The empirical results lead to the following three key findings relating to the relationship between finance and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: (i)
Banking system development as measured by liquid liabilities is positively associated to real GDP per capita. In other words, richer countries in SubSaharan Africa will tend to have more developed banking systems.
(ii) Bank credit does not exhibit a long run relationship with real GDP per capita. In light of finding (i), this suggests that while banking systems may grow in tandem with economic growth, their ability to extend credit to the private sector does not follow suit. (iii) Real income per capita is weakly exogenous with respect to financial development, however measured. Loosely speaking, finance does not lead to economic growth in SSA.
These findings, which are consistent with the insights of Honohan and Beck (2007) , Andrianova et al. (2010) and Demetriades and Fielding (2010) , highlight the dysfunctional nature of African credit markets. Banking systems could be growing reflecting increased demand for financial services, while vital firm and household credit remains scarce. The broken link between the real economy and bank credit can go some way in explaining why financial development does not result in additional economic growth. Fixing this link seems essential to kick start the finance and growth cycle in Sub-Saharan Africa. To this end, the strengthening of creditor protection laws and related informational infrastructure, including credit information bureaus, seems critical.
